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FOREWORD
Although the norm of "one man, one vote" is widely accepted in the United
States, the political realities frequently fail to correspond to that norm. For example,
unequal distribution of wealth is reflected in voting strength-either by reason of
property or poll tax limitations on the right to vote or because of the practical
necessity for ample funds to finance the campaign expenditures of a modern campaign. Corrupt practices and outright voting fraud are also not unknown in this
country as creators of inequalities in the right to vote.
Sex was eliminated by the nineteenth amendment as a determinant of entitlement
to vote. Although the fifteenth amendment prohibited the use of race and color to
abridge voting rights, there is considerable evidence that in actual practice these
factors can have a very real effect on the opportunity to vote. Moreover, the value
of a citizen's right to vote often hinges on the location of his residence in relation
to the electoral units of the state where he lives. This inequality has become all the
more noticeable in recent years because of long-protracted failure to reapportion or
redistrict to take account of the flight from the farm to cities and suburbs.2
Since the political realities depart so markedly from the ideal of an all-inclusive
equal right to vote, should an effort be made to change existing practices; or, on the
other hand, is re-examination of this ideal called for? Also, should any desired
changes be left to the states for accomplishment, or should federal action be utilized
for this purpose?
Clearly the draftsmen of our Constitution intended that the separate states should
have considerable autonomy in choosing between competing norms in respect to the
grant of suffrage and then in implementing that choice. In connection with the
election of representatives in the Congress, article one of the Constitution provides
that "the Electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for Electors
of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature."' More than a century later
an analogous provision was placed in the seventeenth amendment with respect to the
election of Senators. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court recently ruled that
LThe voter's geographical location in relation to the electoral units utilized in municipal elections may
also affect the value of his right to vote in such election.
2 In Tennessee, the failure to reapportion had continued for almost sixty years prior to the decision
in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (x962).
' Art. I, §2, cl.3. With respect to presidential electors, article II, section 1, clause 2 provide.that
"each State shall appoint, in such manner, as the legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors ....
(Emphasis added.)

328

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

a state could adopt the ideal of a literate, rather than an all-encompassing, electorate
and could enforce that ideal by restricting the franchise, even in elections of federal
officers, to persons passing a fairly-administered literacy test prescribed by state law.4
However, the Constitution also definitely entrusts to the federal government some
area of responsibility as to voting rights. Although the state legislatures may prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives," the Congress may "make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators."' Moreover, Congress was specifically empowered to "enforce
by appropriate legislation" the voting rights protected by the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments.
These constitutional authorizations of congressional action to enforce voting rights
might be construed as an indication of an intention that legislative action, rather
than judicial decree, should be primarily relied on to formulate the norms for
voting entitlement and to provide remedies for departures from those norms.
Under this view, the courts would not be required to enter a "political thicket." On
the other hand, leaving the responsibility for orderly change in the hands of legislators, whether state or federal, makes the accomplishment of change dependent
to a considerable extent on the altruism of those persons who benefit from the
status quo.
Dissatisfied with the well-demonstrated lack of any such altruism, the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr7 has finally committed the courts to judicial activism
in the protection of the right to vote.! That decision, however, only signifies that
the courts have a right to take action; and it does not prescribe the standards which
should govern that action or the means for implementing those standards once
they have been determined. Baker v. Carr has already induced-and will undoubtedly continue to induce-legislative action intended to obviate the occasion
for further judicial intervention in the electoral process; but the legislatures, like
the courts, will be called upon to make some basic choices between competing
norms. The editors of Law and ContemporaryProblems hope that this symposium
will materially aid judges, legislators, and the public in an urgently needed reappraisal
of our ideals concerning the right to vote and of our present electoral practices.
ROBINSON 0. EVERETT.
Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).

It is interesting to note

that § 2 of the fourteenth amendment provides for reduction of the basis of representation when the right
to vote "is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime. .. ."
5
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Art. I, § 4, cl. I.
U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2.
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U.S. x86 (1962).
* Long continued inactivity in another field produced a recent significant change of position by the
Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (196i). In this connection, see Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at
Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319.

